The United Nations Security Council is expected to vote today on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the authorization of measures contained in resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 related to the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. The draft resolution also contains several new provisions concerning the arms embargo and assets freeze measures imposed by resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011 and modified by subsequent resolutions.
The UK, the penholder on Libya, authored the draft text. According to the Security Council Report website, negotiations on the draft resolution were apparently difficult. The UK circulated an initial draft of the text to Council members on 3 October, convening the first round of negotiations on 5 October and then another round on 9 October to discuss the first revised draft. On 10 October, the UK postponed the vote on the resolution—which was initially scheduled for 12 October—to allow more time for discussion, and circulated a second revised draft, inviting comments until 11 October.
Later that day, the UK placed a third revised draft under silence procedure until 12 October, which was broken by Russia. A fourth revised draft was placed under silence procedure until 13 October, which was broken by France. On Monday (16 October), the UK circulated a fifth revised draft and placed it under silence procedure until Tuesday (17 October). The US broke silence on that draft. Subsequently, the UK placed a sixth revised draft directly in blue without an additional silence procedure.
The draft resolution extends the authorizations and measures related to the illicit export of petroleum until 1 February 2025 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 February 2025. These provisions were apparently uncontroversial and were not subject to substantive discussion during the negotiations. It seems, however, that new provisions concerning the arms embargo and assets freeze elicited extensive deliberations.
The draft text contains new language regarding the assets freeze. This includes a new operative paragraph noting the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) recent request to reinvest its frozen liquid assets and requesting the Panel of Experts to provide recommendations in their next report on possible actions to enable this step.
During the negotiations, there was apparently some disagreement among certain Council members—including China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the A3 (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique)—that wanted the Council to accommodate the LIA’s request, and other—primarily Western—members that were more reticent in light of the LIA’s continued management challenges and Libya’s unstable political environment. The request for recommendations from the Panel of Experts appears to be a compromise between these two positions.
New language on the arms embargo is also included in the draft resolution. It contains a new operative paragraph, which was apparently proposed by the UAE, enumerating all existing exemptions to the embargo, which were previously listed in separate resolutions. It seems that the UAE also proposed a new operative paragraph limiting the authorisation of the EU naval force in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI)—most recently renewed through resolution 2684 of 2 June—to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. It appears that this proposal was not incorporated in any of the drafts, however.
Council members also discussed proposed new language responding to the Panel of Experts’ assertion that the entry of foreign naval vessels carrying embargoed items into Libya constitutes a violation of the arms embargo, even if such items remain on board the vessel and are not transferred to Libyan actors. It seems that numerous drafts of the resolution contained a new operative paragraph deciding that naval vessels used by countries solely to deliver exempted items remain outside the scope of the embargo, provided that any embargoed items that may be on board such vessels “are for defensive purposes and remain at all times aboard the vessel or aircraft whilst temporarily in Libya”.
While Council members apparently agreed on the substance of this proposal, they held conflicting views about the context in which it applied. Some members—including Russia—argued that the provision was simply clarifying existing rules, while others—including the US—maintained that the decision would mark a departure from current practice. It appears that members were unable to bridge these different interpretations, and the penholder consequently removed the paragraph from the draft.
Another debated issue concerned language on the reunification of the Libyan military. The draft resolution contains a new operative paragraph expressing the Council’s readiness to consider, as an initial step in the overall reunification of Libya’s military and security institutions, the transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to reunified military units once such units have been formed. The paragraph specifies that such activity is to occur under the auspices of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the two Chiefs of Staff.
In this context, there appears to have been disagreement among some Council members about whether and how to refer to the Chiefs of Staff, based on members’ divergent positions on the recognition of rival Libyan authorities. At the US’ request, the UK deleted the reference to the Chiefs of Staff from the fourth revised draft, which caused France to break silence. The fifth revised draft reinserted the language, referencing the “Joint Chiefs of Staff”, apparently prompting an objection from the US regarding potential implications of the word “joint” for equating or recognising the respective authorities. In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue again refers simply to the “Chiefs of Staff”.